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That researchers look for the inverted-U shape in inequality in the
arbitrary periods of arbitrary countries underlies the divergent empirical
evidence across studies. To point to the right context for the pattern, this
paper establishes a formal mechanism in line with Kuznets’ explanation
that relates to the industrialization-cum-urbanization phases of closed
trade regimes. The mechanism involves an interaction among urban–
rural sectoral size differences, agricultural tastes/income, and migration,
and predicts an inverted-U shape in inequality in the following way: (i)
widening differences in the sizes of urban and rural sectors due to
exogenous shocks affect negatively the agricultural tastes/income,
worsening inequality; (ii) increasing sectoral size differences and decreas-
ing agricultural tastes/income jointly foster intersectoral migration;
(iii) migration acts, in turn, as an equilibrating effect, improving the
income distribution. Empirically testing these predictions, non-Sub-
Saharan developing countries’ data support the mechanism, while data
fromdeveloped andSub-SaharanAfrican countries provide little support,
as per our prior expectations. This highlights a contrasting evidence on the
inverted-U shape across country groups of differing development stages.
Keywords: Kuznets’ hypothesis; inequality; intersectoral size differences;
agricultural tastes; migration
JEL Classifications: C51; O14; O45
1. Introduction
Kuznets’ seminal contribution made the following observation. Suppose
that the urban sector becomes more productive than before and,
consequently, the income gap between rural and urban sectors becomes
substantial. Then, inequality in the society would first rise. However, as
people move from the rural sector to the urban sector as a response to the
income differential, inequality would then fall:
[A] long swing in the inequality characterizing the secular income structure:
widening in the early phases of economic growth when the transition from the
pre-industrial to the industrial civilization was most rapid; becoming stabilized
for a while; and then narrowing in the latter phases. (Kuznets 1955, 18).
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In the 1950s, sufficiently long and reliable time series were available only for
the US, England and Germany. Kuznets’ investigation of these time series
indicated that, after having risen earlier, inequality was indeed falling in these
countries. Consequently, the inverted-U pattern in inequality became one of
the most heralded stylized facts of the income inequality studies. The
common practice in nearly every inequality study has been to look for the
pattern by observing the sign of a per capita income variable and its square in
an inequality regression. The empirical evidence using this approach ranges
from positive or negative support to insignificant relationships. Casual model
specifications, the diversity of the countries used in the analyses, arbitrary
time periods searched, and the numerous different control variables used
seem to have affected the sign of per capita income. Most of these studies
essentially checked the behaviour of the income distribution with respect to
the changes in the ‘mean’ of the distribution. The channels through which the
changes in the mean affect the distribution itself have largely been ignored.1
In addition, what underlies the change in the mean is largely skipped. In sum,
most studies offered some results on the ‘realized’ behaviour of income
inequality within a country over time, virtually independent of Kuznets’ own
explanation of the pattern.2 With such an approach, a very large World Bank
data set presented by Deininger and Squire (1996) yielded no support for the
pattern for more than 95 countries.
It is, however, not surprising that looking for the inverted-U shape in
inequality independent of the specific domain in which it is suggested does
not deliver supporting results. Kuznets’ observation of declining inequality
in the US, England and Germany relates to the latest stages of closed trade
regimes in these countries, i.e., closed at least by the standards developed by
Sachs and Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003).3 This period had
involved significant industrialization-led urbanization (i.e., significant rural–
urban migration). In the case of developing countries, this phase often
coincided with import-substituting trade policies.4 As Kuznets (1955) states,
‘when industrialization and urbanization were proceeding apace and the
urban population was being swelled . . . fairly rapidly by immigrants . . . from
agricultural areas . . . the urban population would run the full gamut from
low-income positions of recent entrants to the economic peaks of the
established top-income groups’. This quote clearly indicates that the pattern
should not be searched in any arbitrary period of any country. While the
‘realized’ behaviour of income inequality may not follow an inverted-U
pattern in a country, the shape can exist conditional upon the domain and
the time period searched.
In this paper, we propose a formal mechanism that provides a refreshed
aspect on the pattern along the lines that Kuznets initially explained it.
Specifically, in the context of a closed economy, a new structural
relationship, formed by (i) intersectoral size differences (newly introduced
to the literature); (ii) agricultural tastes/income; and (iii) migration,
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underlies the refreshment. The intersectoral size differences arise when each
manufacturing firm uses k times more labour than does a typical farm. The
resulting gap between the average sizes of urban and rural sector firms gives
rise to intersectoral and national inequality. Inequality increases both
directly and indirectly, the former due to diverging rural and urban incomes,
and the latter through reduced consumption of, and weakening tastes for,
agricultural goods. The plight of agriculture in turn prompts an intersectoral
migration, which works as an equilibrating mechanism in the economy,
decreasing inequality. This cycle repeats itself continuously whenever
intersectoral size ratio k changes over time due to certain exogenous
determinants (most notably due to technological changes).
This mechanism marks the main contribution of this paper. While
offering distinct insights for the trade-regime economic-development link, it
enhances our understanding of the inverted-U pattern in inequality in a
variety of ways. First, instead of taking the pattern simply as a manifestation
of a non-linear link between per capita income and inequality, in the light of
Kuznets’ observations it portrays the process as the one that links
intersectoral size ratio k, agricultural tastes/income, and migration.
Secondly, it portrays economic development not only as an improvement
in incomes, but also as a process that involves changes in utilities, habits,
and life styles. Thirdly, our empirical analysis finds support for the model’s
predictions for developing countries, but less so for developed and Sub-
Saharan African country groups, thereby highlighting contrasting evidence
for the inverted U-shape for countries of different development stages.
We believe, in particular, that intersectoral size ratio k is a very
important contribution. First, it proves to be a very strong variable
theoretically and empirically, instigating and moderating the inverted-U
shape in inequality. Secondly, k not only explains the rural–urban income
gap that is mostly taken as exogenous in many studies, but its determination
through (exogenous) advances in technology provides a further background
for the inverted-U pattern in inequality.
To take an example, . . . a workman . . . could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost
industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly could not make twenty. [With
division of labor,] [o]ne man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third
cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving, the head; [i]n
this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some
manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, . . . (they can make) forty-
eight thousand pins in a day. (Smith 1937, 2)
Increases in k to a great extent reflect adoption of technology over time that
has been relatively more extensive in manufacturing than in agriculture,
pointing to increased division of labour.5 A simple per capita income-
inequality regression bypasses this depth. Thirdly, in the absence of any
significant technological advance, an increase in kmay reflect substitution of
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labour for capital under the import-substitution policies. These policies
typically resulted in macroeconomic bottlenecks, foreign exchange con-
straints and restrictions on capital imports towards the end of their legacy.
Fourthly, as suggested by Kuznets, technological changes via k also affect
the consumption pattern of different groups in the society along the
development process:
[t]he technological changes that have accounted for the rise of modern industry
and for concomitant industrialization and urbanization have meant that
consumers, who as producers had to live in the cities, have required goods and
services that were not essential in the countryside . . . television sets can be seen
as a substitute for village feasts in the way of recreation, and railroads and
automobiles as a substitute for horses in the way of transportation. (Kuznets
1966, 102)
Changing composition of dowries from agri-based goods to durable goods,
and increased unemployment of saddle-makers against increased employ-
ment of workers in tyre factories represent different aspects of changing
cultural attitudes in the development process. For empirical support of
rising k, take a look at Figures 1, 2 and 3 in the Appendix, where it is
measured by the average number of workers in manufacturing firms (where
farm sizes are mostly constant).6 The data on k, which go back to the 1950s,
provide an interesting rising trend over time for many countries.
In our empirical analysis, we specify a recursive triangular system, and
test the inter-relationships among the structural variables in a unifying
framework. In particular, we test: (i) how the intersectoral firm size
differences influence 7 directly and indirectly 7 the agricultural income
and tastes; (ii) how a change in agricultural income/tastes acts on migration;
and (iii) what happens to the income distribution as a result of migration.
This system is estimated with single-equation as well as simultaneous
equations methods. We test the predictions using three country groups:
developed countries, Sub-Saharan African countries, and developing
countries (except Sub-Saharan Africa). It is our contention that Kuznets’
hypothesis holds if and only if (1) a country is in the industrialization-led-
urbanization stage; and (2) it has a closed economy with import
substitution. By that token we also predict that Kuznets’ hypothesis would
not hold in countries that were already industrialized and/or were open at
the beginning of our data period as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa, in which
industrialization-led-urbanization had not started by then.
The estimation results verify our expectations: the structural variables
are estimated with high significance levels with the predicted signs using the
data on developing countries (except Sub-Saharan Africa). These results are
relatively robust to many sensitivity checks such as different specifications,
estimation methodologies and measures. By contrast, the data on developed
and Sub-Saharan African countries provide considerably lower support for
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the mechanism. Even though k may be observed to rise in those countries, it
may not have instigated the k-agricultural tastes/income-migration process,
with the implication that an inverted-U shape is not observed. We conclude
that a structural relationship should be explored in the right context 7
otherwise, one can scarcely find evidence.
Section 2 presents the model and the predictions on Kuznets’ hypothesis;
Section 3 describes the empirical methodology. In Section 4, we discuss the
data issues. In Section 5, we present our empirical results. In Section 6, we
discuss the sensitivity of our results, and Section 7 concludes.
2. The model and the predictions
We use a simple two-sector model in which variables such as labour
demand, labour supply, and leisure of agents, as well as the resulting sectoral
prices, manufacturing wage, rural and urban profit, are determined
endogenously. This is an extension of our closed-economy assumption.7
Thus, the model examines not only the effects of the urban–rural income gap
on migration but also of migration on the urban–rural income gap.8
One may view the migration decision as an occupational choice decision.
In that vein, the seminal work of Banerjee and Newman (1993) (BN
hereafter) proves to be an important reference point for our model. In BN,
there are subsistence producers, (industrial) workers, self-employed people
and entrepreneurs; the latter employ workers. Subsistence producers and
workers only need labour. One needs a certain threshold level of setup
capital to be self-employed and an even larger threshold to become an
entrepreneur. These thresholds bring ‘increasing returns to investment’ into
the picture. BN consider a very complicated structure to shed light on
occupational choice decisions, which involves credit-rationing and enforce-
ment of loan contracts via financial and legal penalties, etc (see Ray 1998,
for a simplified version of BN). Consequently, BN7 instead of providing a
complete mathematical analysis of their model 7 confine their attention to
two special cases. One interesting implication of BN’s model is that
inequality breeds inequality.
Studying the inverted-U pattern in inequality, our analysis will focus
only on factors that affect the level of inequality in the development process.
Migration is a crucial feature in this setup because the inverted-U shape is
about evolution of occupational patterns via migration. Our setup also
makes use of the utility dimension of migration choice to reflect the fact that
economic development is not only about change in incomes, but it is a
process that involves changes in habits, lifestyle and expectations, affecting
migration decisions.
Our framework includes farmers, workers and entrepreneurs. Identical
rural family farms, using their own family labour, produce the agricultural
good. In the manufacturing sector, entrepreneurs and workers produce the
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manufacturing good. Households possess a simple Cobb-Douglas utility
function, the arguments of which are leisure, an agricultural good and a
manufacturing good. There is only one variable input in the economy,
namely labour (as in the other works in the literature). Each farmer and
worker chooses his/her leisure 7 and thus labour 7 level.
Agents are risk-neutral. As also noted by BN, partnerships are not
attractive in the presence of risk-neutrality. Thus, each manufacturing firm
will be owned by a single entrepreneur. Using the available technology in
manufacturing, an entrepreneur can hire k41 identical workers. That is,
each manufacturing firm uses k times the labour that a typical farm does.
So, k represents the ratio of the number of employees per establishment in
manufacturing to the number of workers per farm.9 It turns out that this
difference between the two sectors’ production structures10 manifested by k
suffices to generate the urban–rural income gap. Farmers respond to this
income gap by migrating to the urban manufacturing sector where they
become workers.
Each agent lives one (normalized) period. Then their offspring takes
over. The offspring of a farmer, who chooses not to migrate, becomes a
farmer again. Thus, the only social mobility option for farmers is to migrate
to the city and become workers, after leaving their spot to their offspring for
the following period. Each individual will be replaced by one offspring. The
offspring of the city dwellers can become a worker or an entrepreneur with a
probability that will depend on the ratio of an entrepreneur’s income to that
of a worker (to be made precise below).
2.1. Agriculture
The agricultural sector consists of small producers, who use their own
labour, and experience diminishing marginal product of labour. The amount
of land and capital of each farm will be normalized to one unit. A farm’s
production function is (la)
1/2 , where la denotes the agricultural labour used
in each farm with la 2 (0,1). Let pa denote the agricultural good’s price.
Thus, a farm’s (or in short a farmer’s) income is Ya¼ pa(la)1/2 (observe
that Ya¼ pa (la)1/2¼ paþwala since pa¼ pa(la)1/27wala where pa is the
agricultural profit and wa is the agricultural wage rate).
A farmer’s utility is given by ua ¼ Laaafa m1a
f
a where L stands for leisure
and La¼ 17la holds, with a f 2 (0,1).11
2.2. Manufacturing
At a given point in time, the fraction of labour force who work in the rural
sector and produce agricultural output will be denoted by A2(0,1). Thus, the
fraction of the labour force who works in the urban sector and produce
manufacturing output will be 17A.
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In the manufacturing sector, let 1/(kþ1) fraction of individuals be
entrepreneurs and thus, k/(kþ1) fraction of individuals be workers, where k
is an integer greater than 1. So, there are k workers per firm, and thus per
entrepreneur. It is worth emphasizing again that k represents the relative
firm size of industry to agriculture. Hence the population fraction of farmers
is A, while the population fraction of workers is k(17A)/(kþ1) and that of
entrepreneurs is (17A)/(kþ1).
We will normalize the price of the manufacturing good by assuming
pm¼ 1. The profit of the firm, given its Constant-Returns-to-Scale
production function k(lm)
1/2, is pm¼ k(lm)1/27wmklm where wm is the
manufacturing sector’s wage, and lm denotes the labour input by an
individual. The entrepreneur draws his profit on one (normalized) unit of
capital.12
An entrepreneur’s utility is given by ue ¼ Leaame m1a
m
e where a
m 2
(0, 1).
In the above utility specification for entrepreneurs, we use am instead of
the a f that we have used for farmers. Kuznets (1966, 102) links technological
changes7 i.e. increases in k7 to increases in (17 am) for the city dwellers.
The relevant quote in the Introduction epitomizes this change.
A convenient and straightforward way of representing that link is to
assume am¼ 1/k (and thus, (1 7 am)¼ (k 7 1)/k). Hence, in the remainder
of the paper, we will assume a f to be exogenous and constant for farmers
and am¼ 1/k for entrepreneurs and workers.
Hence, an entrepreneur’s income is Ye¼ pm þ wmle.
Now consider a worker’s utility function, which is given by
uw ¼ Lwaamm1am where Lw¼ 1 7 lw. A worker’s income is Yw¼wmlw.
As mentioned above, a worker’s offspring can become an entrepreneur
with some probability. Each period, k will determine the ratio of workers to
entrepreneurs. Suppose W is the set of workers and E is the set of
entrepreneurs. Let #W and #E denote their cardinalities, respectively.
Note that after a wave of migration, #W/#E may not be equal to k any
longer. To complete the model and to maintain the consistency of k, we
incorporate the following simple process: When a new period starts with its
own level of k, the offspring of the previous period’s workers and
entrepreneurs will become the new workers and entrepreneurs with certain
probabilities. Although each person on average will have a 1/k chance to
become an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur’s offspring’s chance of becoming
an entrepreneur is (Ye/Yw)
g times more likely than that of a worker’s
offspring, where g 1. That is, if g¼ 1, the relative likelihood that an
entrepreneur’s offspring becoming an entrepreneur instead of a worker’s
offspring becoming one is proportional to the ratio of the parents’ incomes.
If g41, then this relative likelihood increases, meaning that social mobility
will become lower. This is in line with the ‘inequality breeds inequality’ idea
of BN.
The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 257
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
3:1
7 0
8 A
ug
us
t 2
01
1 
2.3. Equilibrium levels of incomes
Our first result provides the equilibrium levels of income for farmers,
entrepreneurs and workers, and how the levels of a f, k and A affect these
equilibrium incomes.
Proposition 1
(1) A farmer’s income is Ya ¼ 1AA 1ð1afÞðkþ1Þ
h i
1
2
 1=2
:
(2) An entrepreneur’s income is Ye ¼ pm ¼ k 12 12
 1=2
:
(3) A worker’s income is Yw ¼ lmwm ¼ 12 12
 1=2
:
Due to our normalization pm¼ 1, a worker’s income Yw comes out fixed
at a normalized level 12
1
2
 1=2
. As a result, the incomes of an entrepreneur and
a farmer are expressed relative to that of a worker. Observe that an
entrepreneur’s income is k times that of a worker.
For agrarian societies, A is very close to 1. Since k41, even for very high
levels of a f, it is straightforward to see that Yw > Y

a should hold for such
societies due to low levels of (17A)/A andYa. But for very low levels of A
(i.e., in a highly urbanized society), Yw > Y

a need not hold because (17A)/
A, and consequently Ya will be very high. Thus, the equilibrium income
levels found in Proposition 1 lead us to the intersectoral income gap.
Corollary 1. Yw=Y

a and Y

e=Y

a (and thus Y

w  Ya and Ye  Ya) increase in k
and A but decrease in a f. That is, the intersectoral income ratio (and gap)
increases as there is (i) more labour per entrepreneur, (ii) less urban labour
force in the society, and (iii) less demand for agricultural goods, because these
factors lower a farmer’s income, with worker’s income unaffected and
entrepreneur’s income increased. In addition, Yw=Y

a and Y

e=Y

a (and
Yw  Ya and Ye  Ya) depend on k both directly 7 and through am¼ 1/k
7 indirectly.
2.4. Equilibrium level of relative labour force
The migration decision of a farmer 7 who becomes a worker upon
migrating to the urban sector 7 need not depend on whether or not Yw
exceedsYa.
13 It may depend on whether or not a farmer’s utility ua exceeds a
worker’s utility uw.
14 We will show, however, that regardless of whether one
uses utility or income as the basis of a migration decision, migration in
equilibrium will cease even for very large levels of k.
The link between k and a is not needed when farmers are assumed to
compare their incomes to decide whether or not to migrate. However, if
farmers compare their utilities for a migration decision, the link between k
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and a becomes essential. As mentioned above, our theoretical results hold
regardless of how farmers make their decision. However, using both
decision criteria will enable us to empirically test the intuition of Kuznets (in
linking k and a) as well as whether it is income or utility that is the basis of
the farmers’ migration decision.
Theorem 1. Regardless of whether potential migrants make their migration
decision based on utility or income, the following holds:
(1) An equilibrium level of 1AA 2 (0,1) exists.
(2) Suppose af and am tend to each other such that in the limit a f¼ am¼ a.
Then migration will continue as long as 1AA <
ð1aÞðkþ1Þ
2 and will stop
when. 1AA ¼ ð1aÞðkþ1Þ2 _ In addition, the equilibrium level of 1AA will
decrease in a and increase in k.
The first part of the theorem states that migration stops onceA tapers off to
a certain level. To shed light on the effects of a and k on migration, the second
part of the theorem considers a special yet reasonable and tractable case7 the
case where a f and am eventually tend to each other. Widespread use of
communication, information and transportation technology and the resulting
unprecedented wave of cultural diffusion globally underlie this case. Given this
case, we are able to identify the circumstances under which migration will
continue and how a and k affect the equilibrium fraction of urban population.
2.5. Equilibrium level of inequality
To measure the level of ‘overall’ (i.e., not just intersectoral) inequality in the
society,15 we will use the Gini coefficient, G. A higher Gini coefficient
corresponds to a higher income inequality.
Theorem 2. G decreases in (17A) and a, but increases in k.16
To see the intuition of this result, consider Corollary 1 (as well as the
specific results of Proposition 1). As k increases, the incomes of farmers will
fall below those of workers and (especially) entrepreneurs. Likewise, as a
decreases, the incomes of farmers will fall further below those of workers
and entrepreneurs. However, as (17A) increases 7 which is only possible
through migration 7 the incomes of farmers this time will get closer to
those of entrepreneurs and workers.
2.6. Model’s relevance to the Kuznets’ hypothesis
By utilizing Kuznets’ (1966) observation on the negative relationship
between a and k as well as our Theorems 1 and 2, a comparative-static setup
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can illuminate the relevance of our analysis to the inverted-U shape in
inequality.
(1) An increase in k increases intersectoral and national inequality
directly and indirectly.17 The direct effect of k on inequality is that
inequality rises by Corollary 1, as the incomes of farmers fall below
those of workers and (especially) of entrepreneurs. Inequality rises
further with the indirect consumption effect: the increase in k
decreases am7 i.e., an absolute fall in farmers’ income. As for stated
reasons, a f and am cannot stay too far apart for too long; we will use
one common a instead of separate a f and am. Thus, testing the link
between k and a will also allow us to test whether it is income or
utility that is the basis of the farmers’ migration decision.
(2) Migration increases in response. Part 2 of Theorem 1 predicts that
the (equilibrium) level of the urban–rural labour force ratio depends
positively on the level of k and negatively on the level of a. This
implies that the increase in k fosters migration, given the level of a,
and the equilibrium urban–rural labour force ratio decreases in a,
given the level of k.
(3) Inequality decreases in response to migration. Theorem 2 predicts
that inequality depends negatively on (17A) and a, and positively on
k. This suggests that an increase in (17A) (i.e., accumulated
migration stock) works as an equilibrating mechanism in the
economy, and decreases the inequality, given the levels of a and k.
Note that none of these results could be obtained in a small open economy
framework, as in that setup domestic sectoral prices would simply be
determined by the world sectoral prices.
3. Econometric analysis
The predictions of the theoretical model above imply fully testable relation-
ships. Clearly, similar predictions can be obtained by using different assump-
tions and approaches. In our empirical analysis, therefore, we will adhere to a
literal test of the theoretical predictions both to check the empirical validity of
our theoretical assumptions as well as to see if the predictions themselves
receive support from data. In particular, in the context of a closed economy,
we test the Kuznets’ observation on the negative relationship between a and k
(the indirect effect) and our Theorems 1 and 2 (the direct effect).
3.1. Predicted specification
The econometric model specification predicted by the theory is given
below:
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ait ¼ d0 þ d1kit þ
XP
p¼2
dpXit þ uit ð1Þ
ð1 AitÞ
Ait
¼ g0 þ g1ait þ g2kit þ
XR
r¼3
grYit þ vit ð2Þ
INEQit ¼ f0 þ f1
ð1 AitÞ
Ait
þ f2ait þ f3kit þ
XS
S¼4
fsZit þ oit ð3Þ
where i denotes countries and t denotes time, P, R, S are parameter
indices for each model, a is the fraction of income spent on agricultural
goods in a country, k is the number of workers per entrepreneur in each
country, A is the share of agricultural labour force in the total labour
force, thus
ð1AÞ
A is the ratio of non-agricultural to agricultural labour
force, and INEQ is the income inequality indicator, i.e. the Gini index. X,
Y and Z denote the control variables of the respective equations. We
describe our benchmark control variables below, and their alternatives are
discussed in Section 5.
In equation (1), we test the inverse relationship between a and k as
suggested by Kuznets. Thus, we expect a negative sign for d1.
In equation (2), we test the effects of a and k on the equilibrium urban to
rural labour force ratio. An increase in k would make farmers worse off. A
decrease in a would intensify this, as the farmers live on agricultural goods.
Farmers respond to this decrease in a by migrating to the urban
manufacturing sector. Thus, we expect a negative sign for g1 and a positive
sign for g2.
In equation (3), the effects of ð1AÞA , k and a on inequality are tested.
Based on the theoretical assumption that rural people will be employed in
the manufacturing sector after migration and start earning the same income
as initial workers, we expect a higher urban labour force fraction to decrease
inequality. This predicts a negative sign for f1. This process would take
place given the levels of k and a, and inequality will be increasing in k and
decreasing in a.
A very significant point is that the ascension of countries over the
inverted-U shape of inequality is tested through the impact of a and k on
ð1AÞ
A and INEQ, and the descension is tested through the impact of a andð1AÞ
A on INEQ.
3.2. Data and sample
As a reflection of the idea that the Kuznets hypothesis cannot be tested for
any arbitrary country, we test the predictions of the theory across different
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samples. The model is written in the specific context of a dual economy to
echo Kuznets’ reasoning on the inverted-U shape. Thus, an empirical test in
conformity with the model’s predictions should be undertaken with data
from the closed-economy periods of the countries. We are able to match the
closed economy 7 a k 1Að ÞA – Gini combination of the data for 32
developing countries, providing us with between 78–80 observations for the
estimating sample.18 Because this sample brings together a relatively
homogeneous lot of countries, we call this our ‘base’ sample, and it is
thought to be the most suitable sample to find support for the model and
Kuznets’ hypothesis. Note that this sample excludes Sub-Saharan African
countries. Indeed, 13 Sub-Saharan African countries provide the necessary
data with 19–21 observations,19 enabling us to build another sample that
combines the base and Sub-Saharan African countries. It is expected that
the data in this sample will provide lower support for the theoretical
predictions. Moreover, closed regimes of 12 developed countries provide 15
observations for the necessary variables,20 giving us the opportunity to build
two additional samples: base þ developed, and base þ developed þ Sub-
Saharan African. These two samples, too, are expected to provide lower
support for the model than only the base countries’ sample would. One
advantage of forming samples in this way is to test whether or not each
country group shares similar characteristics in their roles in the data
generating process.
The opening years for each country are taken from Sachs and Warner
(1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003).21 The agricultural tastes variable, a,
is approximated by the share of agricultural value added in GDP, adjusted
for agricultural imports and exports. We interpret a decrease in the share of
agricultural labour force as migration to manufacturing.
Of the key variables in our setup, k is measured by the ratio of number of
employees to the number of establishments in manufacturing. We have data
for k as far back as the 1950s and 1960s, and thus its evolution within
countries is observed.22 The relevant data are obtained from the United
Nations UNIDO and General Industrial Statistics databases.
We obtain the inequality data from the United Nations WIDER
database, which is an augmented version of the Deininger and Squire (1996)
(henceforth D-S) data set with some developed and transition countries data
added. Very interestingly, most inequality studies have found conflicting
results on the Kuznets hypothesis by using the D-S data set.23 These results
naturally cast doubts on the quality of the data set. Our model of the
domain most relevant to Kuznets’ own explanation would thus be a
different test of the D-S data set in this respect.
In addition, we use certain dummy variables to control for differences in
the construction of the Gini data. We use a PERSON dummy if a Gini
observation is based on personal income (as opposed to household income).
In addition, a NET income dummy is used as opposed to gross income
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construction. Finally, for the purposes of enlarging our data set, we use a
few Gini observations that were classified as non-acceptable by D-S;
however, we do control this by using an NA dummy in the regression.24,25 In
addition, we construct our data set in five-year intervals.
The long-run in-built dynamic structure in the theoretical model can be
best captured with a long panel data set. In this sense, having an unbalanced
panel with some countries having short time horizons may appear to be a
disadvantage for the empirical analysis. It must be noted that it is very
difficult to obtain the data for each individual country and capture the entire
period in which the inverted-U pattern in inequality is observed. Never-
theless, the fact that our samples cluster countries of differing development
stages, and that within each cluster data points are spread in a relatively
balanced manner across the 1960–89 period, provides us with a rich
variation in the cross-country dimension of the data set.
3.3. Estimation
The econometric models specified in equations (1)–(3) are the structural
equations of a simultaneous equations system, whereby the joint determina-
tion of endogenous variables a, ð1AÞA and INEQ is recursive. In a triangular
system, the first equation is completely determined by exogenous factors (in
our case k), and the second endogenous variable is determined by the first
endogenous variable, and so on. A non-diagonal structural disturbance
covariance matrix suggests contemporaneous correlation across equations,
and this necessitates the identification of the system and use of simultaneous
equations methods for consistent estimation (see Greene 2000, 393).
Otherwise, OLS would provide consistent estimates. In our case, the
suggested Breusch and Pagan (1980) test indicates some evidence for the
possibility of a non-diagonal covariance matrix for the base sample, while
the other samples do not indicate such correlation.26
Reverse causality from the left-hand side variables to k should also be
considered. Once farmers start migrating and becoming workers in
manufacturing, k is expected to increase in equation (2). k may additionally
be endogenous to a and INEQ due to reasons outside our theoretical model.
We test for reverse causation related to k through the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test, and find mixed evidence across equations and samples. k may also
create a heteroskedasticity problem. Thus, we estimate our systems with
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), addressing all these potential
problems. As instruments, we use the exogenous variables and the lagged
values of the endogenous variables in each relevant equation. As per the
identification of the system, the rank and order conditions are met as each
equation has its own distinct exogenous variable.27
Because the data set is an unbalanced panel with some countries
having very short time horizons (some of them have only one time period
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available), the provision to test for panel effects is limited. With the nature
of data at hand, two equivalent estimators (i.e. Dummy Variables and
Within) provide different results due to changes in the sample composi-
tion. Owing to sub-optimalities associated with these estimators, we
consider the panel effects in the sensitivity analysis section. For our
benchmark analysis, we group countries into three relatively homoge-
neous lots.
3.4. Control variables
In equation (1), demographic, geographic, and cultural factors can affect
people’s tastes. The share of arable land in total surface area can control in a
cross-country setting the effects of agricultural land availability on the tastes
of people. Likewise, high population density in rural areas may result in
more affinity for agricultural goods. However, high rural population density
may also increase on-farm consumption of the agricultural goods, and
therefore reported tastes (through agricultural GDP) may be under-
estimated. Which effect is stronger is an empirical question. Additionally,
religious factors may be part of cultural effects to determine the affinity for
agricultural goods. Finally, small island countries may have lower
agricultural tastes, i.e., production of cash crops as against income from
tourism services.
In equation (2), (1–A)/A can be perceived in two ways: (i) relative
manufacturing/agricultural labour force, and thus the capacity of
manufacturing to that of agriculture, and (ii) migration stock per farmer.
In the case of (i), schooling can capture the potential of the economies to
grow into manufacturing.28 There are also oil producing countries in the
sample. As their manufacturing and agriculture structures may be
different, this effect should be controlled for. In the case of (ii), total
surface area of the countries can indicate the spread of settlements,
division of urban and rural settlements within the country, and thereby
mobility of the labour force. Landlockedness and latitude may affect
both (i) and (ii) in that while the former can affect the accessibility to
capital goods from the world markets, the latter can point out to natural
resource endowments and influence the efficiency and productivity in
production.29
For equation (3), Schultz (1998), among others, proposed that regional
differences explain an important variation in the levels of inequality; thus,
we use regional dummies Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and
Pacific, etc. We also use NET, PERSON and NA dummies to control for
differences in Gini construction. In addition, Rodrik (1999b) finds that
democracies pay higher wages, resulting in lower inequality due to higher
income of blue collars. In the sensitivity analysis section, we use alternative
control variables, as suggested by Li et al. (1998).
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3.5. Other data sources
We provide the sources of other data in Appendix B. Note that most
variables in our estimations are in percentage points, not in decimals, to
make the interpretation easier. Summary statistics for the main variables are
provided in Table 1.
4. Empirical results
4.1. GMM results
In equation (1), k is estimated to have a highly significant (at 1% level) and
negative effect on a in the base and baseþdeveloped countries cases (with
coefficients 70.047 and 70.042, respectively), while the samples that
include Sub-Saharan African countries provide no significant relationship.
This implies that, holding other factors constant, Kuznets’ observation on
the negative relationship between a and k is working only in developing and
developed countries. The coefficient 70.047 implies that a falls by 4.7%
with every additional 100 workers per firm in the economy, holding other
factors constant.
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Sample Variable Mean Median Max Min
Std.
Dev.
#
Obs.
#
Country
Base k 76.60 57.77 459.44 3.11 63.98 81 32
a (%) 21.36 19.20 63.98 3.53 13.12 82 32
1A
A
1.59 1.14 8.133 0.09 1.57 81 32
Gini 45.86 47.54 62.00 30.06 7.99 78 32
NET 0.32 0 1 0 0.47
PERSON 0.47 0 1 0 0.50
NA 0.12 0 1 0 0.33
Developed k 39.09 28.49 134.43 13.33 30.96 15 12
a (%) 10.81 10.00 19.70 3.16 5.27 15 12
1A
A
6.82 7.37 16.67 0.99 4.59 15 12
Gini 37.39 36.23 52.20 28.13 6.91 15 12
NET 0.27 0 1 0 0.46
PERSON 0.27 0 1 0 0.46
NA 0.33 0 1 0 0.49
Sub-Saharan
African
k 120.82 101.22 299.74 62.85 57.10 21 13
a (%) 31.22 25.81 75.21 4.93 20.08 21 13
1A
A
0.96 0.30 5.85 0.09 1.58 21 13
Gini 50.61 49.50 64.75 33.00 9.30 19 13
NET 0.63 1 1 0 0.50
PERSON 0.84 1 1 0 0.38
NA 0.32 0 1 0 0.48
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Table 2. Predicted specification, system (GMM) estimations.
Dep. RHS Base Base þ Base þ
Base þ
Dev’d
Var. Variables Sample Dev’ed. SS Afr. þSS Afr.
Constant 24.288 72.746 721.958 716.168**
(1.221) (70.653) (71.183) (72.392)
k 70.047*** 70.042*** 0.027 0.028
(73.263) (72.914) (0.557) (0.665)
Arable land 0.088* 0.090* 0.047 0.064
(1.738) (1.814) (0.502) (0.749)
a Log Rural
PopDen.
3.319** 3.929*** 7.382*** 6.251***
(2.299) (5.764) (4.247) (4.549)
Small Island 710.351*** 711.526*** 718.406*** 717.402***
(73.028) (74.528) (74.100) (75.116)
Religion
Variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R2 0.60 0.60 0.30 0.34
# Obs.
(# Country)
64 (28) 75 (37) 82 (39) 93 (47)
Constant 3.396*** 2.580 2.229** 1.985
(4.370) (1.212) (2.283) (1.098)
a 70.057*** 70.033*** 70.040*** 70.028**
(73.854) (72.183) (73.191) (72.156)
k 0.005** 0.003* 0.004** 0.004*
(2.019) (1.657) (1.970) (1.721)
Schooling 0.336*** 0.761*** 0.490*** 0.771***
(3.371) (7.108) (4.892) (7.354)
Log Surface Area 70.236*** 70.322 70.201*** 70.268
1A
A
(72.980) (71.605) (72.709) (71.572)
Landlocked 1.331** 1.104 0.256 0.190
(2.288) (1.439) (0.554) (0.389)
Oil Prod. 2.910*** 2.759*** 2.656*** 2.558***
(6.581) (7.590) (6.310) (4.694)
Latitude 0.013 0.031* 0.026*** 0.027**
(1.148) (1.935) (2.721) (2.211)
Adj.R2 0.74 0.51 0.64 0.52
# Obs.
(# Country)
64 (28) 75 (37) 82 (39) 93 (47)
Constant 59.179*** 58.580*** 57.065*** 56.951***
(10.631) (10.597) (13.207) (13.867)
a 70.316*** 70.264** 70.259*** 70.225**
(72.776) (72.369) (72.726) (72.505)
k 70.021 70.022 70.004 70.006
INEQ (70.963) (71.033) (70.218) (70.360)
1A
A
71.247*** 71.055*** 71.400*** 71.013**
(72.996) (72.653) (73.017) (72.427)
Democracy 76.409* 78.251** 74.841 76.763*
(continued)
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In equation (2), a is estimated to have a strongly significant (at 1% level)
negative effect on (1–A)/A. The coefficients are significant across all samples,
while their magnitudes range between70.028 and70.057. The base sample
has the highest impact with coefficient 70.057, while the effect of Sub-
Saharan countries in terms of reducing the coefficient magnitude is
noteworthy. The coefficient 70.057 implies that in the base countries every
17.5% decrease in a (e.g. from 50% to 32.5%) is associated with a higher
relative labour force ratio by 1 unit (for example, in terms of division of the
labour force between non-agricultural and agricultural sectors, a change
from 50%–50% to 67%–33%, or from 67%–33% to 75%–25%). In this
equation, k is estimated to have a significant migration-fostering impact in
the base and baseþSub-Saharan African countries, with the effect likely to
be driven by Sub-Saharan Africa. The estimated significant coefficients
imply that every additional 200–250 workers per entrepreneur is associated
with a higher relative labour force ratio by 1 unit, holding other factors
constant.
In equation (3), we estimate a with significant and negative coefficients
across all samples. The coefficients range between 70.225 and 70.317 but
the highest effect is observed in the base countries. As per (1–A)/A in all
cases is it estimated with significant and negative coefficients. This negative
sign implies that the countries with higher migration would have lower
inequality. The samples with base and baseþSub-Saharan African countries
provide greater significant coefficients (between71.25 and71.40) than the
samples with developed countries (which are around 71.0). This reaffirms
the point above on the effectiveness of the migration-inequality process in
different sets of countries; i.e. higher effectiveness in developing countries. It
also implies that the curvature of the inverted U-shape owing to this
mechanism is steeper in those countries. Lastly, the data do not provide
Table 2. (Continued).
Dep. RHS Base Base þ Base þ
Base þ
Dev’d
Var. Variables Sample Dev’ed. SS Afr. þSS Afr.
(71.773) (72.179) (71.281) (71.813)
Regional
Dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
NET, PERSON,
NA
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.23 0.29 0.14 0.27
# Obs.
(# Country)
60 (27) 64 (31) 75 (38) 79 (42)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *denotes significance at 10% level, **at 5% level and ***at
1% level.
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support for the direct impact of k on income Gini. This might be due to the
strict literal test that we are undertaking and/or the data quality, and
therefore we explore this issue further in the sensitivity analysis section by
relaxing our approach.
Thus, overall, while the indirect effect of a change in k on the migration
process is not working in Sub-Saharan Africa (from equation (1)), the direct
effect is weakly working in the developed countries (from equation (2)). On
the other hand, both effects are working in the base (developing) countries.
In addition, it is found that migration, as shown by an increase in (1–A)/A,
has an equilibrating effect on income distribution in all countries, although
its effect is relatively more pronounced in the base and baseþSub-Saharan
African countries (from equation (3)).
There are also important implications in the estimation of the control
variables. For instance, in equation (3), a higher democracy score is
associated with lower inequality, with the effect being insignificant in Sub-
Saharan Africa. There is around 6–8 Gini points difference between the most
free and the most dictatorial regime, holding other factors constant. In
equation (1), population density in rural areas has a significant positive sign,
favouring the affinity argument. Interestingly, samples with Sub-Saharan
African countries provide higher coefficients. The small-island dummy has a
significant and negative sign, again with varying coefficients across samples.
In equation (2), higher schooling and oil production are associated with
higher levels of relative labour force across the samples, while higher surface
area lowers the ratio, an effect statistically significant only in base
countries.30 Finally, although not shown in the tables, regional dummies
add relatively little to the explanation of inequality in the base countries (see
the Adjusted R-squared), probably because our state variables are able to
catch those effects.
4.2. OLS results
The OLS results (presented in Table 3) show that our results remain
qualitatively similar to GMM results. In the bottom panel of Table 3, the
Breusch-Pagan test results are presented. Among all samples, the base coun-
tries case provides the highest test statistic (with a p-value 0.21). Although
weak, we consider this as an evidence for cross-equation information.
4.3. A total effect analysis
The theoretical model is built with a number of assumptions and restrictions
and as such does not predict any particular magnitude. Although, in such a
case, using the coefficient magnitudes to find a numerical relationship in the
k-migration-inequality mechanism may be misleading, it may be useful to do
so in order to understand the mechanism. The difference between the lowest
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Table 3. Predicted specification, OLS estimations.
Dep. RHS Base Base þ Base þ
Base þ
Dev’d
Var. Variables Sample Dev’ed. SS Afr. þSS Afr.
Constant 34.581*** 3.406 1.396 76.355
(3.386) (0.533) (0.087) (70.831)
k 70.040*** 70.036*** 70.011 70.003
(72.706) (73.044) (70.586) (70.122)
Arable land 0.120** 0.093* 0.101 0.0702
(2.197) (1.817) (1.171) (0.901)
a Log Rural
PopDen.
2.807** 4.184*** 6.042*** 6.087***
(2.461) (5.542) (3.513) (5.218)
Small Island 710.211*** 711.621*** 718.071*** 717.198***
(72.748) (74.017) (73.611) (74.867)
Religion
Variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2
# Obs.
(# Country)
0.62 0.58 0.36 0.58
80 (32) 95 (44) 101 (45) 116 (57)
Constant 2.918*** 3.087 2.130** 2.460
(3.962) (1.597) (2.410) (1.553)
a 70.036*** 70.024 70.032*** 70.020*
(74.338) (71.482) (73.688) (71.715)
k 0.003** 70.000 0.001 0.000
(2.315) (70.124) (0.990) (70.037)
Schooling 0.333** 0.826*** 0.461*** 0.830***
(3.732) (6.111) (4.958) (6.546)
1A
A
Log Surface
Area
70.198*** 70.384** 70.180** 70.321**
(72.917) (72.104) (72.595) (72.112)
Landlocked 1.014*** 1.040 0.222 0.307
(2.543) (1.565) (0.637) (0.722)
Oil Prod. 2.923*** 2.653*** 2.556*** 2.447***
(5.964) (6.622) (5.893) (7.498)
Latitude 0.009 0.043** 0.025*** 0.037***
(0.972) (2.537) (2.559) (2.861)
Adj. R2 0.77 0.60 0.70 0.62
# Obs.
(# Country)
80 (32) 95 (44) 97 (45) 112 (57)
Constant 57.843*** 50.928*** 55.669*** 50.991***
(15.269) (11.156) (15.209) (13.129)
a 70.312*** 70.163* 70.227*** 70.129*
(73.016) (71.743) (72.564) (71.637)
k 70.013 70.007 0.002 0.007
INEQ (71.070) (70.639) (0.275) (0.724)
1A
A
71.319*** 70.627* 71.379*** 70.646*
(72.916) (71.893) (73.335) (71.847)
Democracy 77.331** 78.328** 75.916* 78.187**
(72.086) (72.147) (71.710) (72.435)
(continued)
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and the highest k in our base sample is 456.5 (the lowest belongs to Iran (65–
69) with 3.1 and the highest belongs to Guyana (80–84) with 459.4). For such a
difference, our estimated model predicts a lower a value by 21.46%
(456.5670.047) for Guyana, holding other factors constant. In the sample,
Iran has an a value of 37% and Guyana has 4%. Given other effects such
as the size of the countries and other consumption habits of the people, the
difference between the estimated value and the actual value is plausible.
Higher k and lower a create a potential for intersectoral income gap,
causing migration. Thus, the model predicts a higher (1–A)/A for Guyana
by 3.5 units (70.0576721.46þ456.560.005). In reality, the difference is
1.8; Iran has a (1–A)/A of 1.1 and Guyana has a value of 2.9 (the division of
the labour force across sectors is roughly 53%–47% for Iran and 74%–26%
for Guyana). Admittedly, k is only one of the reasons behind the fall in
agricultural income and thus there should remain some uncaptured effects
on migration. Finally, the 21.46% difference in a should lead Guyana to
have a 6.8 higher Gini point (721.46670.317, where the k effect does not
work on Gini). The subsequent migration effect, after having worked,
should decrease Gini by 4.6 points (71.24763.7). Thus, the model predicts
2.2 higher Gini points for Guyana, holding other factors constant. In
reality, Guyana has a Gini of 56 (gross, household, acceptable) and Iran has
a Gini of 49 (net, person, acceptable).31 Recall that our purpose is to
confirm the theoretical signs with data only; we believe that the estimations
deliver plausible magnitudes for the k-migration-inequality mechanism. The
differences should be reconcilable given all the measurement issues on Gini
and many other determinants of the endogenous variables, as well as the
theoretical and empirical restrictions on the analysis.
Table 3. (Continued).
Dep. RHS Base Base þ Base þ
Base þ
Dev’d
Var. Variables Sample Dev’ed. SS Afr. þSS Afr.
Regional
Dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
NET,
PERSON,
NA
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.31 0.36 0.21 0.27
# Obs.
(# Country)
74 (32) 89 (44) 92 (45) 107 (57)
BP test w2 4.64 1.18 3.94 3.44
(1980) p-value 0.21 0.76 0.28 0.35
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *denotes significance at 10% level, **at 5% level and ***at
1% level. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimation. BP: Breusch-Pagan (1980)
test statistic.
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5. Sensitivity analysis
We check the sensitivity of our results on a number of grounds.
5.1. Sensitivity of the regressors
In equation (1), we try various specification checks such as excluding the
control variables one at a time and using them in different combinations. It
turns out that all controls are jointly important for the significance of k in
the base and baseþdeveloped countries.32
In equation (2), while all controls are jointly important in the baseþSub-
Saharan African sample, controlling for oil production is necessary to
obtain a significant k in the base sample. a remains robustly significant in all
checks.
As per equation (3), Li et al. (1998) explain international and
intertemporal variation in inequality on the basis of political economy
and capital market imperfection arguments. They find that civil liberties,
initial level of schooling (of 1960), land Gini (i.e., asset inequality), and M2/
GDP (indicator of financial development and credit opportunities) are
important determinants of inequality. We include all these variables into our
specification (except civil liberties, which was already included as part of
democracy), and it turns out that these variables have no explanatory
power. However, a, (1–A)/A and democracy remain strongly significant with
their original signs, with k still insignificant. Removing the regional
dummies from the regression does not change this result. However,
removing our state variables from the regression makes land Gini positive
and significant (with also democracy being significant), implying that our
state variables can capture the political economy part of Li et al.’s (1998)
argument. The insignificance of the financial development controls can be
attributed to the closed economy period we are looking at.
One can argue that certain controls in X, Y and Z may belong to the
other equations as well. By retaining one distinct variable in each equation
(i.e., log area in equation (2) and democracy in equation (3)), we re-estimate
the equations with all controls included (using the base sample). Although
we lose the significance of k in equations (1) and (2) and that of a in equation
(2), a great majority of the controls that we have specified as belonging to
the other equations are estimated to be insignificant in their ‘new’ equations.
This ensures that our original choice of the controls for the respective
equations is relevant.
5.2. Econometric concerns
Once migration starts, the right-hand side variable k in equation (2) is also
expected to increase, suggesting an endogeneity. k may also be endogenous
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Table 4. Hausman test for k.
Dep. RHS Base Base þ Base þ
Base þ
Dev’d
Var. Variables Sample Dev’ed. SS Afr. þSS Afr.
Constant 22.438 72.814 727.581 718.446***
(0.967) (70.624) (71.449) (72.663)
k 70.048*** 70.043*** 0.032 0.029
(72.830) (72.530) (0.928) (1.062)
Arable land 0.094* 0.094* 0.014 0.028
(1.845) (1.778) (0.143) (0.316)
a Log Rural
PopDen.
3.520*** 3.945*** 7.109*** 6.098***
(2.679) (5.460) (3.883) (4.513)
Small Island 79.783*** 711.409*** 719.557*** 718.049***
(72.507) (74.101) (74.143) (75.020)
Religion Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Residual k 0.025 0.010 70.117* 70.114**
(0.490) (0.235) (71.984) (72.382)
# Obs.
(# Country)
64 (28) 75 (37) 82 (39) 93 (47)
Constant 2.807*** 2.111 1.752* 1.808
(3.267) (0.962) (1.714) (0.966)
a 70.044*** 70.032** 70.034*** 70.025*
(73.694) (72.044) (72.579) (71.812)
k 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.004**
(2.916) (2.235) (2.170) (2.023)
Schooling 0.394*** 0.774*** 0.547*** 0.772***
(3.773) (6.926) (4.948) (7.337)
1A
A
Log Surface 70.214*** 70.285 70.194** 70.260
Area (72.796) (71.383) (72.555) (71.484)
Landlocked 1.215** 1.126 70.096 0.020
(2.098) (1.376) (70.211) (0.042)
Oil Prod. 2.910*** 2.737*** 2.649*** 2.556***
(6.681) (7.308) (6.145) (7.436)
Latitude 0.014 0.028 0.030** 0.029**
(1.125) (1.729) (2.553) (2.089)
Residual k 70.008 70.014** 70.006 70.008*
(71.452) (72.420) (71.494) (71.884)
# Obs.
(# Country)
63 (28) 74 (37) 82 (39) 89 (47)
Constant 60.517*** 52.582*** 56.693*** 52.462***
(12.638) (8.650) (12.627) (11.017)
a 70.355*** 70.207* 70.268** 70.192*
(73.769) (71.888) (72.476) (71.878)
k 70.022 70.009 70.003 0.006
INEQ (71.306) (70.564) (70.190) (0.362)
(17A/A) 71.333*** 70.981** 71.481*** 70.980**
(73.006) (72.340) (72.895) (72.166)
(continued)
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in equations (1) and (3) due to reasons not endogenized in our theoretical
model for tractability reasons. For instance, lower relative prices of
agricultural goods in the world markets may switch the output composition
towards manufacturing, hence, increasing k. Moreover, when the govern-
ment is an important employer in the economy, hiring decisions can be
based on redistribution concerns in an unequal society, suggesting an
endogeneity for k in equation (3). Thus, we carry out a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test (Davidson and McKinnon 2004, 338).33 The test results,
reported in Table 4, indicate that k is endogenous to (1–A)/A in all samples
except the baseþSub-Saharan African sample (in essence, the no-
endogeneity effect in this sample is dominated by the Sub-Saharan African
countries). There is also evidence for endogeneity of k in equation (1) in the
samples with Sub-Saharan African countries, while none in the others.
Endogeneity in equation (3) is found only in the base sample. Thus,
instrumenting k with its lagged value and running a GMM estimation is an
appropriate strategy from an econometric point of view. The state variables
a and (1–A)/A remain strongly significant in the respective regressions with
this exercise.
As an alternative to GMM, we use Three-Stages Least Squares (3SLS).
Our results remain qualitatively similar in this case (Table 5) although there
are some (but weak) efficiency gains associated with GMM.34
We also analyse the panel dimension of the data. There are, however,
limitations with this analysis. About half of the countries in our data set
possess only one time period’s data. This implies that a Dummy Variables
estimator can capture the panel effects related to countries with more than
Table 4. (Continued).
Dep. RHS Base Base þ Base þ
Base þ
Dev’d
Var. Variables Sample Dev’ed. SS Afr. þSS Afr.
Democracy 75.271 75.637** 74.117 76.345
(71.357) (71.254) (70.985) (71.562)
Regional
Dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
NET,
PERSON,
NA
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Residual k 0.071* 0.054 0.026 0.019
(1.864) (1.353) (0.791) (0.535)
# Obs.
(# Country)
60 (27) 71 (37) 75 (39) 86 (47)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *denotes significance at 10% level, **at 5% level and ***at
1% level. Robust standard errors. Residuals from an auxiliary regression whereby the suspected
endogenous variable k is regressed on lagged k.
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Table 5. (a) Three stages least squares (pooled and dummy variables).
Dep. RHS
Base Sample Base þ Dev’ed
Var. Variables 3SLS 3SLS-DV 3SLS 3SLS-DV
Constant 24.288 96.973*** 72.746 7.734
(1.502) (6.743) (70.450) (1.466)
k 70.047*** 70.072*** 70.042*** 70.038***
(73.073) (77.499) (72.857) (73.518)
Arable land 0.089 70.655* 0.090 70.109
(1.429) (71.686) (1.593) (70.785)
a Log Rural
PopDen.
3.319** 712.328*** 3.929*** 2.232**
(2.505) (74.693) (4.561) (2.192)
Small Island 710.351*** 711.526***
(73.201) (74.341)
Religion
Variables
Yes No Yes No
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
# Obs.
(# Country)
64 (28) 64 (28) 75 (37) 75 (37)
Constant 3.396*** 71.351** 2.581 71.573*
(3.978) (72.126) (1.551) (71.717)
a 70.057*** 0.007 70.033 70.020
(73.743) (0.422) (71.151) (70.718)
k 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003 0.001
(2.794) (2.892) (0.958) (0.411)
Schooling 0.336*** 0.543*** 0.760*** 0.831***
(3.607) (6.665) (6.184) (9.632)
1 A
A
Log Surface
Area
70.236*** 70.322**
(73.759) (72.426)
Landlocked 1.331** 1.104
(2.154) (0.792)
Oil Prod. 2.911*** 2.758***
(10.592) (4.446)
Latitude 0.013 0.031*
(1.201) (1.878)
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
# Obs.
(# Country)
64 (28) 64 (28) 75 (37) 75 (37)
Constant 59.179*** 45.781*** 58.580*** 45.706***
(10.584) (14.106) (10.438) (14.186)
a 70.316** 0.210* 70.264** 0.211**
(72.561) (1.956) (72.249) (1.971)
k 70.021 0.026*** 70.022 0.025***
INEQ (71.328) (3.155) (71.391) (3.079)
(17A)/A 71.247* 70.825 71.055*** 70.650
(71.821) (71.245) (72.835) (70.988)
Democracy 76.409 73.534 78.** 73.591
(71.561) (71.561) (72.238) (71.599)
(continued)
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Table 5. (Continued).
Dep. RHS
Base Sample Base þ Dev’ed
Var. Variables 3SLS 3SLS-DV 3SLS 3SLS-DV
Regional
Dummies
Yes No Yes No
NET, PERSON,
NA
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
# Obs.
(# Country)
60 (27) 60 (27) 64 (31) 64 (31)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *denotes significance at 10% level, **at 5% level and ***at 1%
level. Base andBaseþDev’ed sample. Pooled andDummyVariable (fixed effects) 3SLS estimations.
Table 5. (b) Three stages least squares (pooled and dummy variables).
Dep. RHS
BaseþSS Afr BaseþSS AfrþDev’ed
Var. Variables 3SLS 3SLS-DV 3SLS 3SLS-DV
Constant 721.957 716.750 716.168* 720.962***
(71.321) (70.744) (71.712) (72.216)
k 0.027 70.013 0.028 0.018
(1.000) (70.515) (1.197) (0.817)
Arable land 0.047 0.078 0.064 70.087
(0.492) (0.332) (0.727) (70.446)
a Log Rural
PopDen.
7.382*** 9.299** 6.251*** 9.121***
(4.068) (2.501) (4.680) (5.318)
Small Island 718.406*** 717.402***
(73.880) (74.186)
Religion
Variables
Yes No Yes No
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
# Obs.
(# Country)
82 (39) 82 (39) 93 (47) 93 (47)
Constant 2.229** 71.770*** 1.985 72.345***
(2.330) (73.344) (1.334) (71.717)
a 70.040*** 1.338 70.028 0.013
(73.395) (1.436) (71.434) (1.016)
k 0.004* 0.003* 0.004 0.002
(1.818) (1.935) (1.004) (1.147)
Schooling 0.490*** 0.618*** 0.771*** 0.871***
(5.139) (7.733) (7.353) (10.215)
1A
A
Log Surface 70.201*** 70.268**
Area (72.960) (72.426)
(continued)
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one time period, with countries with only one time period forming the base.
A Within estimator, on the other hand, eliminates all the countries with one
time period from the analysis. Estimates with the latter (not reported) do not
possess much statistical significance due to the culled data set. Thus, we
restrict ourselves to the Dummy Variables estimator for the comparability
with our benchmark results. Proceeding with 3SLS,35 we find that our main
results remain similar (Tables 5(a) and 5(b)). k in equation (1) remains
statistically significant at 1% with a negative sign in the base and
baseþdeveloped countries sample, while insignificant in samples with Sub-
Saharan Africa. For equation (2), k is estimated to be significant at 1% with
a positive sign for the base sample. Its significance is much lower in other
samples. Finally, k becomes significant at 1% with a positive sign in
Table 5. (Continued).
Dep. RHS
BaseþSS Afr BaseþSS AfrþDev’ed
Var. Variables 3SLS 3SLS-DV 3SLS 3SLS-DV
Landlocked 0.256 0.190
(0.698) (0.287)
Oil Prod. 2.656*** 2.558***
(8.788) (4.694)
Latitude 0.026*** 0.027*
(2.632) (1.932)
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
# Obs.
(# Country)
82 (39) 82 (39) 93 (47) 93 (47)
Constant 57.065*** 61.755*** 56.951*** 61.680***
(12.256) (15.712) (12.350) (16.024)
a 70.259** 70.231*** 70.225*** 70.230***
(73.061) (73.457) (72.810) (73.510)
k 70.004 70.019 70.006 70.019
INEQ (70.212) (71.403) (70.353) (71.454)
(17A)/A 71.400** 71.374 71.013*** 71.294
(72.099) (71.537) (72.608) (71.479)
Democracy 74.841 71.758 76.763 71.757
(71.140) (70.518) (71.629) (70.530)
Regional
Dummies
Yes No Yes No
NET,
PERSON,
NA
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
# Obs.
(# Country)
75 (38) 75 (38) 79 (42) 79 (42)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *denotes significance at 10% level, **at 5% level and ***at
1% level. BaseþSS Afr. and BaseþDev’edþSS Afr. sample. Pooled and Dummy Variable (fixed
effects) 3SLS estimations.
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equation (3) for the base and baseþdeveloped countries sample. This
strengthens our original results because k was estimated to be weakly
significant in equation (3) before.36
Why does k work on income inequality with the control of panel
effects? The answer is possibly related to the meaning of the value of k.
For instance, 100 workers of Bangladesh may produce the same product as
60 workers of Colombia, and if we look at only the Between-variation in
Table 6. ManVA/AgrVA for k, base sample, system estimation (GMM).
Variables/Dep.
Var. a (17A)/A INEQ.
Constant 67.156***
(5.394)
1.707**
(2.249)
55.381***
(12.923)
a 70.008
(70.529)
70.249**
(72.102)
ManVA
AgrVA
75.169***
(76.534)
0.605***
(3.370)
0.513
(0.466)
1A
A
71.431**
(72.403)
Arable total
land
0.074
(1.488)
Log Rural
Pop. Den.
0.588
(0.429)
Small Island 74.393**
(72.348)
Schooling 0.192*
(1.889)
Log Surface
Area
70.143*
(71.852)
Landlocked 0.292
(0.725)
Oil Producing 2.470***
(4.046)
Latitude 0.007
(0.668)
Democracy 710.102***
(72.454)
Religion Var’s. Yes
NET,
PERSON,
NA
Yes
Regional
Dummies
Yes
Adj. R2 0.70 0.83 0.38
# Obs.
(# Country)
65 (29) 65 (29) 59 (29)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *denotes significance at 10% level, **at 5% level and ***at
1% level.
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k, Bangladesh should have higher inequality than Colombia, other things
being equal. On the other hand, an a value of 50% implies twice as strong
agricultural tastes than 25%, and similarly, a Gini coefficient of 30 implies
twice better income distribution than 60 (if the measurement differences
are controlled for). Thus, it appears that the Within-variation in k (i.e.,
change in k over time) is the effect that is working on the level of
inequality.
5.3. Alternative variables
One can argue that the empirical measure of k, the ratio of the number of
workers to the number of establishments in countries, is too literal to use in
the empirical analysis. One intuitive variable to check k against is the ratio
of manufacturing to agricultural value added (in short, MV/AV) a` la Tybout
(2000). In Table 6, we report the system GMM results using MV/AV in
place for k.37 Just as in the relationship between a and k, MV/AV has a
negative and strongly significant effect on a. It also has the predicted positive
sign in equation (2), being strongly significant at 1%. The sign of a does not
change with this replacement in equation (2), however its significance
decreases. In equation (3), MV/AV is estimated to be insignificant. This
result is the same as the result with k. The Within-variation in MV/AV
(unreported) does not deliver significant results. Nevertheless, both a and
(1–A)/A, which are the key variables in the migration-inequality relation-
ship, remain strongly significant with predicted signs in this equation. Thus,
owing to similar results, we conclude that k represents effectively the relative
size of manufacturing to agriculture sectors.38
6. Concluding remarks
Our starting point in this paper is the widespread inconclusiveness on the
empirical performance of Kuznets’ hypothesis. We ascribe this outcome to
imprecise domains in which the Kuznets hypothesis has been formulated
and analysed. Testing the inverted-U hypothesis only in terms of its shape,
virtually independent of Kuznets’ own reasoning, contributed to the
inconclusiveness further.
Thus, we propose a rationale for the inverted-U pattern in inequality by
establishing a formal mechanism which links, (i) intersectoral size differences
(newly introduced to the literature), (ii) agricultural tastes/income, and (iii)
migration. The intuition is quite clear: in response to an initial exogenous
change in urban technology, there is an increase in the urban–rural wage
gap, and more so as growth of the urban sector also brings about a change
of preferences towards manufacturing products; hence, inequality initially
increases. However, this sparks rural–urban migration and so inequality
ultimately decreases.
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According to Kuznets (1973, 255), prominent features of the pre-
industrial phase have been ‘a low per capita product, a large share of
agriculture and other extractive industries, a generally small scale of
production’ which are captured by our modelling of that sector. The
transition out of the pre-industrial phase entails ‘[t]he sustained rise in the
supply of goods,’ (‘[a]dvancing technology [as] the permissive source’ of it)
as well as ‘a shift away from agriculture to nonagricultural pursuits’
(Kuznets 1973, 247–8). In our study we take the level of k to indicate the
intersectoral firm size ratio as well as the level of adoption of technological
advancement in manufacturing relative to agriculture. An insight of Kuznets
also allows us to incorporate a negative link between k and a. Thus, in this
paper, instead of taking the above process simply as a manifestation of a
negative link between per capita income and inequality, in the light of
Kuznets’ insights we depict it as one that links k, a and migration.
We later test the theoretical predictions of the model. Taking the rising
trend in k within countries as the starting point, we investigated empirically
the indirect and direct effects of change in k on the migration-inequality link
across different samples. The data provide relatively strong and robust
support for the suggested relationships, with expected signs and high
significance levels with the developing countries’ data (except Sub-Saharan
Africa). However, the support decreases when developed and Sub-Saharan
African countries are used, as implied by Kuznets. In other words, even if k
increases over time in those countries, the suggested k-agricultural tastes/
income-migration link may not work due to the structure of the economy.
In this paper we focused only on the phase of industrialization during
which developing countries relied heavily on import substitution policies.
During that phase, clearly the role of migration as an equilibrating
mechanism cannot be overstated. In the last few decades, many countries
switched from import substituting regimes to export promoting ones. This
switch did not seem to slow down migration in most of these countries. It
would be interesting to see whether the inequality has increased or decreased
in these countries following the change in trade regime and what kind of
processes accounted for the changes in inequality.
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Notes
1. There are, however, a few studies that proposed channels to explain the
inverted-U shaped pattern of inequality. See, among others, Williamson (1985),
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Lindert (1986), Anand and Kanbur (1993a), Aghion and Bolton (1997) and
Acemoglu and Robinson (2002).
2. Some exceptional studies have investigated the pattern in the specific context
that Kuznets suggested 7 see Anand and Kanbur (1993a). Ahluwalia (1976a,
1976b) do so as well, but by using a log per capita income in an inequality
regression. Anand and Kanbur (1993b) criticize Ahluwalia.
3. Sachs and Warner (1995) specify five criteria for a country to be considered as
open: (i) average tariffs rates being 40% or less; (ii) nontariff barriers covering
40% or less of trade; (iii) black market premium on the exchange rate being less
than 20%; (iv) no state monopoly on major exports; and (v) not being a
socialist system. Wacziarg and Welch (2003) explore this classification further.
4. In a great majority of developing countries, import-substitution policies lasted
until at least a few decades ago (see Rodrik 1998, 1999a, 2001).
5. Technological enhancements in agriculture have not impacted the farm size
much during the period we focus on; Table 12.2 in Ray (1998, 418) verifies that
the typical farm in the world was still owner cultivated (i.e., was still a family
farm) in 1970.
6. Many studies take the number of workers as the proxy for the size of
enterprises; not surprisingly, there are large size differences among countries.
7. Analysing the inverted-U pattern for open trade regimes is clearly an extension
of this paper, with potentially important implications. In order to stick to
Kuznets’ domain, we restrict ourselves to closed trade regimes.
8. The evolution of a large and extensive migration literature can be traced back
to Lewis (1954), Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro (1970), Stiglitz (1974),
Calvo (1978), Bhatia (1979), Gang and Gangopadhyay (1987), and Quibria
(1988). It must be noted that while some exogenous elements of the Lewis and
Harris-Todaro frameworks have been endogenized (e.g., the rural–urban wage
gap), prices of agricultural and manufacturing products are assumed to be
mostly exogenous due to small open economy assumptions. In addition, agents’
labour supply and leisure decisions are typically bypassed in most frameworks.
9. A detailed description of k will be given below.
10. Adam Smith (1937, 5–6) stated: ‘The nature of agriculture, indeed, does not
admit of so many subdivisions of labour, nor of so complete a separation of one
business from another, as manufactures. It is impossible to separate up entirely,
the business of the grazier from that of the corn-farmer. . . . The spinner is
almost always a distinct person from the weaver; but the ploughman, the
horrower, the seed sower, and the corn reaper, are often the same.’
11. It is well-known that in Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the portions of income
spent on different goods are proportional to the exponents of those goods.
Thus, ai’s portion of each agent i’s income is spent on the agricultural good and
portion (1 7 ai) is spent on the manufacturing good.
12. Apart from the obvious simplifying advantages that this assumption buys us,
the interruptions experienced by many developing countries in the imports of
the essential capital goods provide another justification for this assumption.
13. Although most of the migration literature assumes that individuals compare
their pre- and post-migration incomes to decide about migration, it is clear that
most people in real-life are motivated by concerns other than income7 such as
their leisure levels as well as the relative cost of living in rural and urban areas.
14. When pre- and post migration incomes and/or utilities of farmers are equal, we
will assume that the farmers will choose to migrate because of weak altruistic
preferences. A farmer is said to have weak altruistic preferences if these
preferences enter the decision process if and only if the farmer is undecided to
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migrate or not on the basis of income or utility. The positive social mobility
prospect of their offspring will only matter in case they are undecided in terms
of their own pre- and post-migration welfare.
15. Corollary 1 does not touch upon the fact that an increase in k also widens the
income ratio (and gap) between entrepreneurs and workers.
16. One might consider relating G to a and k only since Theorem 1 relates A to a
and k. But recall that Theorem 1 states only the equilibrium conditions among
A, a and k. As a and k keep changing, A will have to keep adjusting to the
changes in a and k. Hence, Theorem 2 does not only consider inequality at
equilibrium levels of A, a and k; rather, it considers inequality given all possible
levels of A, a and k.
17. Although for the sake of the model’s parsimony, we have taken the levels of a f
and k fixed, they are hardly fixed in real life.
18. The countries and the periods are: Bangladesh 65–69, 70–74, 75–79, 80–84, 85–
89; Bolivia 80–84; Brazil 70–74, 80–84, 85–89; Chile 65–69, 70–74; Colombia
65–69, 70–74, 75–79, 80–84; Costa Rica 80–84; Dominican Republic 75–79, 80–
84, 85–89; Ecuador 65–69, 85–89; Egypt 65–69, 75–79, 80–84, 85–89; El
Salvador 65–69, 75–79; Fiji 75–79; Guatemala 80–84; Guyana 80–84; Honduras
65–69, 80–84, 85–89; India 80–84, 85–89; Indonesia 60–64, 65–69; Iran 65–69,
70–74, 80–84; Jamaica 75–79, 80–84, 85–89; Mexico 80–84; Morocco 65–69,
80–84; Nepal 75–79, 80–84; Pakistan 65–69, 70–74, 80–84, 85–89; Panama 65–
69, 70–74, 75–79, 80–84; Peru 70–74, 80–84, 85–89; Philippines 60–64, 65–69,
70–74, 80–84; South Korea 60–64; Sri Lanka 65–69, 70–74; Sudan 65–69;
Trinidad and Tobago 70–74, 75–79, 80–84; Tunisia 65–69, 75–79, 80–84;
Turkey 70–74, 75–79, 80–84; Venezuela 70–74, 75–79, 80–84, 85–89.
19. The countries and the periods are: Burundi 90–94; C. Afr. Rep. 90–94; Cote
d’Ivoire 85–89; Ghana 80–84; Kenya 80–84, 85–89; Lesotho 85–89; Nigeria 60–
64, 85–89; Senegal 90–94; South Africa 65–69, 80–84, 85–89; Tanzania 65–69,
75–79, 90–94; Uganda 85–89; Zambia 60–64, 75–79, 80–84; Zimbabwe 90–94.
20. The countries and the periods are: Australia 60–64; Bahamas 75–79, 80–84;
Canada 60–64; Finland 60–64; Germany 60–64; Greece 60–64; Ireland 60–64;
Japan 60–64; Netherlands 60–64; New Zealand 70–74, 75–79, 80–84; Spain 60–
64; Sweden 60–64.
21. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) closely and excellently examined the dichot-
omous openness variable of Sachs and Warner by partitioning it into its
original components. They conclude, ‘the Sachs and Warner indicator serves as
a proxy for a wide range of policy and institutional differences,’ the
qualification that we look for in our analysis.
22. Not every country provides a continuous series that can be presented
graphically, although point observations of some countries that are not in the
graphics have been used in the estimations.
23. Depending on the focus of the papers, it is reported that even a slight change in
the state variables, control variables, time span or functional form result in
different implications about the Kuznets hypothesis. See Spilimbergo et al.
(1999), Schultz (1998) and Barro (2000) for different findings. Li et al. (1998)
report that Kuznets’ hypothesis finds support in the cross-country dimension of
the data, rather than within countries over time.
24. For example, Barro (2000) adds some Gini data to his data set that was
classified non-acceptable by D-S, and then uses a dummy variable in the
regression to control for this. In our practice, any potential measurement error
in Gini would also be captured by the error term, because Gini is a dependent
variable.
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25. Ginis are based on expenditures versus incomes in the D-S dataset. As
suggested by D-S (1996), we add 6.6 Gini points to the expenditure-based Ginis
to obtain a consistent series.
26. The squares of the correlations between the residuals of each equation are
multiplied by the corresponding sample size, and their sum provides a chi-
squared test statistic with degrees of freedom equal to the number of equations.
27. With number of instruments greater than the number of parameters in our
equations, the system is said to be over-identified; we conduct the suggested
over-identification tests and the null is accepted in every case.
28. Papageorgiou (2003) finds that primary schooling contributes to the productive
capacity of the economies, while post-primary schooling adds to their
innovative capacity. We experiment with both current level of schooling and
schooling in 1960 and find very similar results.
29. For arguments on the influence of natural resources and latitude on the business
environment, see Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Easterly and Levine (2003).
30. The control dummies on the construction of the income Gini never had any
explanatory power in the regressions, except NA in a few cases, in which case all
three are tested to be jointly equal to zero.
31. Note that net income should be distributed more evenly than gross income due
to progressive taxation systems, which implies that Iran would have a higher
gross income Gini.
32. It is evident that per capita income in economies is an important and strong
determinant of agricultural tastes (Engel-law idea). We do not use this variable
in the a equation as it would be highly correlated with k (both theoretically and
empirically).
33. In an auxiliary regression, k is regressed on a set of exogenous variables and the
residuals from this regression are then inserted in the original regressions. The
significance of the residuals indicates endogeneity. We employed various sets of
exogenous variables in the auxiliary regressions and evidence on endogeneity
varies. For consistency, we use only the lagged k in the auxiliary regressions,
and the test results are based on this instrument.
34. This might be due to the existence of heteroskedasticity related to k, which is
detected, in a single equation context, in equations (1) and (2) through White’s
(1980) test.
35. The econometric implementation with GMM does not converge due to the need
to estimate Nþm parameters (where N is the number of countries with more
than one observation and m is the number of time-variant variables on the
right-hand side of our system), but does with 3SLS. With the GMM and 3SLS
results being quite similar, as found above, this is unlikely to cast doubt on our
results.
36. It turns out that, with fixed effects analysis, a changes its sign to positive in
equation (3) for the base and baseþdeveloped sample, while remaining strongly
significant and negative in the samples with Sub-Saharan Africa. This implies
that it is the dominance of Between-variation in a that results in a negative sign
in the former group of countries. We should re-iterate that we can control for
fixed effects for only part of the data set.
37. Only the base sample is used for this check. Endogeneity and the Breusch-
Pagan tests (unreported) show that MV/AV is endogenous to the dependent
variables in all equations. The p-value for the Breusch-Pagan test is 0.15.
38. We also regress MV/AV on k along with the other controls of the respective
equations (i.e., equations (1), (2) and (3)), and in the first two equations, we
obtain a positive and significant relationship.
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Appendix
Proofs of the theoretical results
Proof of Proposition 1
(1) A skilled worker’s utility maximization problem can be rewritten as
uw¼Lwcw, where cw ¼ aamm1am stands for the composite consumption
good, such that cw¼wm (1 7 Lw).
First order conditions from this problem yield wmLw¼ cw. Plugging cw
into the constraint we get
Lw ¼
1
2
) lsw ¼
1
2
ðA:1Þ
The entrepreneur’s maximization problem can be re-written as ue¼Lece,
where ce ¼ aamm1am stands for the composite consumption good, such that
ce¼wm(1 7 Le) þ pm.
First-order conditions from this problem yield weLe¼ ce. Plugging ce into
the constraint we get Le ¼ 12 ðpm þ wmÞ=wm ¼ 12 ðpmwm þ 1Þ:
Thus, if pmwm  1; we will have Le ¼ 1 (since Le cannot exceed 1). Suppose
that the entrepreneur believes that pmwm  1 will take place and thus he/she
chooses not to work. We will show that in equilibrium the entrepreneur’s
belief and action will be justified.
First-order conditions of pm yield kð12 ðlmÞ
1
2  wmÞ ¼ 0: Thus, demand
for labour per entrepreneur is ldm ¼ kð 12wmÞ
2: But lsw ¼ 12 (and lse ¼ 0). Thus,
equating ldm and the total labour supply in the firm kl
s
w; the equilibrium
manufacturing wage becomes
wm ¼ 1
2
 1=2
ðA:2Þ
Thus, by using equations (A.1) and (A.2), we get
pm ¼ k
1
2
 1=2
k 1
2
1
2
 1=2
¼ k 1
2
1
2
 1=2
ðA:3Þ
Since pm ¼ k 12 12
 1=2
> 12
 1=2¼ wm and because k is an integer greater
than 1, Le ¼ 1 and thus lse ¼ 0.
(2) By using equations (A.1) and (A.2) we get,
lwwm ¼ 1
2
1
2
 1=2
ðA:4Þ
The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 285
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
3:1
7 0
8 A
ug
us
t 2
01
1 
(3) Let pa denote the farmer’s profit and wa denote the farmer’s wage.
Observe that
Ya ¼ pa þ wala ¼ paðlaÞ1=2 ðA:5Þ
since pa ¼ paðlaÞ
1
2  wala:
A farmer’s utility maximization problem can be re-written as ua¼Laca,
where ca ¼ aafm1af stands for the composite consumption good, such that
ca¼wa (1 7 La).
First-order conditions from this problem yield waLa¼ ca. Plugging ca
into the constraint and in Ya we get
La ¼
1
2
; lsa ¼
1
2
;Ya ¼ pa
1
2
 1=2
ðA:6Þ
Thus, each farmer supplies
as ¼ 1
2
 1=2
ðA:7Þ
First-order conditions from any agent i’s utility maximization problem
yield
ai ¼ aiY

i
pa
ðA:8Þ
Where ai¼ a f when agent i is a farmer and ai¼ am¼ 1/k when agent i is a
worker or an entrepreneur.
Since there are two sectors, it follows from Walras’ law that, if one of the
markets is in equilibrium, then so is the other one. Using equations (A.6)
and (A.8), the farmers’ total demand for the agricultural good is
A
afYa
pa
¼ Aaf 1
2
 1=2
ðA:9Þ
Using equations (A.4) and (A.8), the workers’ total demand for the
agricultural good is kð1AÞkþ1
amYw
pa
¼ kð1AÞkþ1
am12
1
2ð Þ1=2
pa
but since am¼ 1/k, the
workers’ total demand for the agricultural good becomes
ð1 AÞ
kþ 1
1
2
1
2
 1=2
pa
ðA:10Þ
Using equations (A.3) and (A.8), the entrepreneurs’ demand for the
agricultural good is ð1AÞkþ1
amYe
pa
¼ ð1AÞkþ1
amk12
1
2ð Þ1=2
pa
, but since am¼ 1/k, the
entrepreneurs’ total demand for the agricultural good becomes
ð1 AÞ
kþ 1
1
2
1
2
 1=2
pa
ðA:11Þ
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Then, by using equations (A.9), (A.10) and (A.11), total demand for the
agricultural good is
Aa
1
2
 1=2
þð1 AÞ
kþ 1
1
2
 1=2
pa
ðA:12Þ
Using equation (A.7), the total supply of the agricultural good is
A
1
2
 1=2
ðA:13Þ
Then, using equations (A.12) and (A.13) (i.e., equating the total demand
and supply of the agricultural good) yields
ð1AÞ
kþ1
1
2ð Þ1=2
pa
¼ Að1 aÞ 12
 1=2
where
a¼ af.
By simplifying it, we get
pa ¼ ð1 AÞ
A
1
ð1 aÞðkþ 1Þ ðA:14Þ
Then, by using equations (A.7) and (A.14)
Ya ¼
ð1 AÞ
A
1
ð1 aÞðkþ 1Þ
1
2
 1=2
ðA:15Þ
This completes proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
(1) We will calculate the individuals’ indirect utility functions.
Recall by the proof of Proposition 1 that the leisure of the farmer and the
worker is 1/2 and that of the entrepreneur is 1. The first order conditions of
ua and uw yield aa ¼ a
fYa
pa
; aw ¼ a
mYw
pa
;ma ¼ afYa;mw ¼ amYw, where am¼ 1/k.
Thus, using the above first-order conditions and the income expressions
in Proposition 1, the indirect utility functions become
ua ¼
1
2
ðafÞafð1 afÞ1af 1
pa
 1af
Ya ðA:16Þ
uw ¼
1
2
ðamÞamð1 amÞ1am 1
pa
 1am
Yw ðA:17Þ
where am¼ 1/k.
Thus, a farmer will choose to migrate if uw > u

a; and will be indifferent
between migrating and not migrating if uw ¼ ua; and will not choose to
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migrate if ua > u

w: Thus, the equilibrium level of
A
1A can be obtained when
uw ¼ ua: By equation (A.4) in the proof of Proposition 1, Yw ¼ 12 ð12Þ
1
2and by
equation (A.15) in that proof, Ya ¼ ð1AÞA 1ð1aÞðkþ1Þ 12
 1=2
. Using some lengthy
but straightforward algebra, uw ¼ ua yields
1 A
A
¼ ð1 a
fÞðkþ 1Þ½ðafÞafam  ð1 afÞafam  1afþam
2
ðA:18Þ
(2) In the proof of Part (1) of this theorem, when a f and am are
arbitrarily close, observe that by equation (A.18) ua >¼< uw will reduce to
1A
A >¼< ð1aÞðkþ1Þ2 :
Thus, when a f and am are arbitrarily close (in which case, for
simplicity one can use a¼ a f¼ am), in equilibrium, we will have
1A
A ¼ ð1aÞðkþ1Þ2 :
Thus, 17A* decreases in a f (and thus am and increases in k. This
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2
By equations (A.3), (A.4) and (A.15) in the proof of Proposition 1 we have
Yw ¼ k 12 12
 1=2
; Yw ¼ 12 12
 1=2
and Ya ¼ ð1AÞA 1ð1aÞðkþ1Þ 12
 1=2
:
Let si denote segment i’s population share. The population weights of
farmers, workers and entrepreneurs are sa ¼ A; sw ¼ kð1AÞkþ1 ; se ¼ ð1AÞkþ1
respectively. Then the average income Y* becomes
ð1AÞ kþ 11að Þ
ð1aÞðkþ1Þ
1
2
 1=2
:
Let ti ¼ Y

i
Y : Thus, te ¼ 12 ð1aÞkðkþ1Þð1aÞkðkþ1Þþ1 ; tw ¼ 12 ð1aÞðkþ1Þð1aÞkðkþ1Þþ1 ;
ta ¼ 12 Aðkþ1Þð1aÞkðkþ1Þþ1.
Given these definitions, the Gini coefficient can be calculated as follows
(see equation (5) of Mookherjee and Shorrocks 1982, 888):
G ¼ 12 ½
P
h
P
k jth  tkj.
Thus, we have G ¼ 12 ð1 aÞ
ð1AÞkðk1Þ
2ðkþ1Þ þ Ak
ð1AÞ
ð1aÞ
kð1aÞþ1 . Straightforward but
lengthy calculations establish that G decreases in a, but increases in k
and A. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Other data sources and definitions
The share of agricultural and manufacturing value added in GDP, arable
land per capita, the share of arable land in total area, surface area, labour
force in agriculture, M2/GDP, and rural population density data are
obtained from World Development Indicators (1999, 2003). The data are
the averages of five-yearly intervals. Data on agricultural exports and
imports are obtained from Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
Trade Yearbooks (various issues starting from 1960). Schooling data are
obtained from Barro and Lee (2001). Land Gini data (obtained from
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Deininger and Olinto 1999); religion variables (shares of people affiliated to
a certain religion in the population 7 obtained from La Porta et al. 1999);
small island, oil producing, and landlocked country dummies, (the absolute
value of) latitude are time-invariant variables. Democracy scores for 1970-
onwards (political rights and civil liberties averaged) are obtained from
www.freedomhouse.org, and used as the averages of five-yearly intervals
(the data are available in 1–7 scale, where 1 is the most democratic. The data
have been converted to 0–1 scale, where 1 is for the most democratic
countries). Those for 1960 and 1965 are from Bollen (1990), which are
available in 0–1 scale already, and used for the initial years of the five-yearly
intervals.
292 N. Anbarci and M.A. Ulubas¸oglu
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
3:1
7 0
8 A
ug
us
t 2
01
1 
